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This paper presents a two-country sticky-price model that allows for capital and
investment spending. It analyzes the conditions for equilibrium determinacy un-
der alternative interest-rate rules that react to either domestic or consumer price
inﬂation. It is shown that in the presence of investment, real indeterminacy is con-
siderably easier to obtain once trade openness is permitted. Consequently we argue
that suﬃciently open economies should adopt a backward-looking rule and suﬃ-
ciently closed economies should employ a current-looking rule, in order to minimize
policy induced aggregate instability.
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11 Introduction
There is a large body of research that has considered the real indeterminacy implications
of designing interest-rate rules in sticky-price monetary models.1 The general conclusion
that emerges from the literature is that in order to rule out real indeterminacy the mon-
etary authority should follow the Taylor principle (i.e. an active policy stance), that is,
a policy that aggressively targets either expected inﬂation (e.g. Bernanke and Wood-
ford (1997), Clarida et al. (2000)) or current inﬂation (e.g. Kerr and King (1996)) by
raising the nominal interest rate by proportionally more than the increase in inﬂation.
However a number of recent studies have challenged the appropriateness of the Taylor
principle in preventing multiplicity of equilibrium once the economic environment allows
for capital and investment spending. Dupor (2001) introduces investment spending using
a continuous- time framework and shows that a passive policy stance is required for equi-
librium determinacy. In a discrete-time framework, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) show
that with the addition of capital and investment spending equilibrium “determinacy is
essentially impossible” under a forward-looking interest-rate rule.2 For current-looking
interest-rate rules, Carlstom and Fuerst (2005), Sveen and Weinke (2005) and Benhabib
and Eusepi (2005) all ﬁnd that the Taylor principle is not a suﬃcient condition for deter-
minacy, although the range of indeterminacy generated is typically small.3
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of investment spending
for equilibrium determinacy for economies that are open to international trade in goods
and assets. Using a discrete-time, money-in-the-utility function framework, this paper
develops a two-country, sticky-price model that allows for capital and investment spend-
ing.4 The conditions for real equilibrium determinacy are analyzed for forward, current
and backward-looking versions of the interest rate rule. In addition, two alternative price
1By real indeterminacy we simply mean that there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths, starting from
the same initial conditions, which converge to the steady state.
2Interestingly, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2007) show that the range of determinacy can be signif-
icantly increased if the monetary authority implements an interest rate policy that responds to both
expected inﬂation and current output.
3Sveen and Weinke (2005) show that the range of indeterminacy is higher if ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is assumed,
relative to the more common assumption of a competitive rental market for capital. Benhabib and Eusepi
(2005) show that the range of parameter values that guarantee local determinacy do not necessarily
guarantee global determinacy.
4To facilitate comparison with the existing literature, this paper adopts the traditional convention that
end-of-period money balances enter the utility function. Assuming an alternative timing-assumption
would have important consequences for equilibrium determinacy, as discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001), Kurozumi (2006) and McKnight (2007).
2indexes, which can be chosen as the policy indicator, are considered: domestic price in-
ﬂation and consumer price inﬂation. By allowing for trade openness, it is shown that
the indeterminacy problem is more severe under a forward-looking interest-rate rule and
gets increasingly worse as the degree of openness increases. This result is robust for both
possible indexes of inﬂation that can enter the feedback rule. However, unlike closed-
economy models, this indeterminacy problem can no longer be dramatically reduced by
adopting an active current-looking rule. For both indexes of inﬂation, indeterminacy is
induced provided the degree of trade openness is suﬃciently high.
The intuition behind these results rests with how the degree of trade openness ex-
acerbates the cost-channel of monetary policy which arises in sticky-price models with
capital. As discussed by Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2007) for a closed-economy,
under an active policy an increase in the real interest rate puts upward pressure on the
expected future rental price of capital, which raises expected marginal cost. Consequently
indeterminacy can arise if the upward pressure on inﬂation generated through this cost
channel outweighs the downward pressure on inﬂation generated through the standard
aggregate demand channel of monetary policy. Allowing for trade openness increases the
eﬀect of the aggregate demand channel on the dynamics of inﬂation. This arises since an
active policy stance results in a improvement in the terms of trade, thereby generating
additional downward pressure on marginal cost. However trade openness also raises ex-
pected marginal cost as a future expected deterioration in the terms of trade is anticipated.
Consequently if the degree of trade openness is suﬃciently large then this cost channel
strictly dominates the demand channel and inﬂation expectations become self-fulﬁlling.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature that focuses on the real inde-
terminacy implications of designing interest-rate rules in the presence of trade openness. A
general conclusion arising from the existing literature is that the degree of trade openness
is only important for aggregate stability if monetary policy responds to expected future
consumer price inﬂation. Reacting to expected future domestic price inﬂation or imple-
menting a current-looking rule guarantees equilibrium determinacy if the Taylor principle
is adhered to.5 Our analysis suggests that with the addition of capital and investment
5See, for example, Zanna (2002), De Fiore and Liu (2005), Batini et al. (2004), Llosa and Tuesta (2006),
Linnemann and Schabert (2002, 2006) and McKnight (2007).
3spending, the degree of trade openness increases the prominence of aggregate instability
with the violation of the Taylor principle. This is robust not only to the index of inﬂation
targeted, but also to the timing of the interest-rate rule employed. The failure of the Tay-
lor principle for open-economies therefore suggests that monetary authorities face much
greater challenges in the design of interest-rate rules. Speciﬁcally, in a sense to be made
precise below, we argue that in order to minimize aggregate instability suﬃciently open
economies should react to backward-looking consumer price inﬂation, whereas suﬃciently
closed-economies should target current-looking consumer price inﬂation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the two-
country model. Section 3 examines the conditions for real equilibrium determinacy when
current-looking interest-rate rules are employed. Section 4 considers the implications of
alternative interest rate rules that react to forward-looking or backward-looking inﬂation.
Finally Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a global economy that consists of two countries denoted home and foreign, where
an asterisk denotes foreign variables. Within each country there exists a representative
inﬁnitely-lived agent, a representative ﬁnal good producer, a continuum of intermediate
good producing ﬁrms, and a monetary authority. The representative agent owns all do-
mestic intermediate good producing ﬁrms and supplies labor and capital to the production
process. Intermediate ﬁrms operate under monopolistic competition and use domestic la-
bor and capital as inputs to produce tradeable goods which are sold to the home and
foreign ﬁnal good producers. The labor and rental capital markets are both assumed
to be competitive. Each representative ﬁnal good producer is a competitive ﬁrm that
bundles domestic and imported intermediate goods into non-tradeable ﬁnal goods, which
are consumed by the domestic agent. Preferences and technologies are symmetric across
the two countries. The following presents the features of the model for the home country
on the understanding that the foreign case can be analogously derived.
42.1 Final Good Producers
The home ﬁnal good (Z) is produced by a competitive ﬁrm that uses ZH and ZF as

















where the relative share of domestic and imported intermediate inputs used in the pro-
duction process is 0 < a < 1 and the constant elasticity of substitution between aggregate
home and foreign intermediate goods is θ > 0. The inputs ZH and ZF are deﬁned as the
quantity indices of domestic and imported intermediate goods respectively:
ZH,t =
















where the elasticity of substitution across domestic (foreign) intermediate goods is λ > 1,
and zH(i) and zf(j) are the respective quantities of the domestic and imported type i
and j intermediate goods. Let pH(i) and pF(j) represent the respective prices of these
goods in home currency. Cost minimization in ﬁnal good production yields the aggregate




































5where P is the consumer price index and PH and PF are the respective price indices of
home and foreign intermediate goods, all denominated in home currency:
PH,t =












We assume that there are no costs to trade between the two countries and the law of one
price holds, which implies that






where e is the nominal exchange rate. Letting Q = eP
∗
P denote the real exchange rate,




























and hence the purchasing power parity condition is satisﬁed only in the absence of any
bias between home and foreign intermediate goods (i.e. a = 0.5). The relative price T,





2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate ﬁrms hire labor and rent capital to produce output given a (real) wage rate
wt and capital rental cost rrt. A ﬁrm of type i has a production technology:
yt(i) = Kt(i)αLt(i)1−α, (7)
where K and L represent capital and labor usage respectively, and the input share is
0 < α < 1. Given competitive prices of labor and capital, cost-minimization yields:


















6where mct ≡ MCt
PH,t is real marginal cost.
Firms set prices according to Calvo (1983), where in each period there is a constant
probability 1−ϕ that a ﬁrm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn
independently of past history. A domestic ﬁrm i, faced with changing its price at time t,
has to choose pH,t(i) to maximize its expected discounted value of proﬁts, taking as given

























and the ﬁrm’s discount factor is βsXt,t+s = [Uc(Ct+s)/Uc(Ct)][Pt/Pt+s].7 Firms that are
given the opportunity to change their price, at a particular time, all behave in an identical
manner. The ﬁrst-order condition to the ﬁrm’s maximization problem yields







The optimal price set by a domestic home ﬁrm   PH,t is a mark-up λ
λ−1 over a weighted
















Since all prices have the same probability of being changed, with a large number of ﬁrms,





H,t−1 + (1 − ϕ)   P
1−λ
H,t (12)
since the law of large numbers implies that 1−ϕ is also the proportion of ﬁrms that adjust
their price each period.
6While the demand for a ﬁrm’s good is aﬀected by its pricing decision pH,t(i), each producer is small with
respect to the overall market.
7Under the assumption that all ﬁrms are owned by the representative agent, this implies that the ﬁrm’s
discount factor is equivalent to the individual’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
72.3 Representative Agent
The representative agent chooses consumption C, domestic real money balances M/P,












where the discount factor is 0 < β < 1, subject to the period budget constraint




The agent carries Mt−1 units of money, Bt nominal bonds and Kt units of capital into
period t. Before proceeding to the goods market, the agent visits the ﬁnancial market
where a state contingent nominal bond Bt+1 can be purchased that pays one unit of
domestic currency in period t + 1 when a speciﬁc state is realized at a period t price
Γt,t+1. During period t the agent supplies labor and capital to the intermediate good
producing ﬁrms, receiving real income from wages wt, a rental return on capital rrt,
nominal proﬁts from the ownership of domestic intermediate ﬁrms Πt and a lump-sum
nominal transfer Υt from the monetary authority. The agent then uses these resources to
purchase the ﬁnal good, dividing purchases between consumption Ct and investment It.
The purchase of an investment good forms next period’s capital according to the law of
motion
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It, (15)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital.
For analytical simplicity we assume that the period utility function is separable among
its three arguments and the labor supply elasticity is inﬁnite.8 The ﬁrst-order conditions





















where Rt denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond deﬁned as R
−1
t ≡
Et{Γt,t+1}. Equation (16) is the consumption Euler equation for the holdings of domestic
bonds and the money demand equation is given by (19). Equations (17) and (18) are the
respective labor supply and optimal investment conditions. Optimizing behavior implies
that the budget constraint (14) holds with equality in each period and the appropriate
transversality condition is satisﬁed. Analogous conditions apply to the foreign agent.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions for the home and foreign agent, the following risk-



















. Equation (20) is the standard uncovered interest
rate parity condition and equation (21) is the risk sharing condition associated with
complete asset markets, which equates the real exchange rate Q with the marginal utilities
of consumption.
2.4 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority can adjust the nominal interest rate in response to changes in
domestic price inﬂation πh



















9where R > 1 and the timing-index v represents the inﬂation-targeting behavior of the
monetary authority. If v = 0, the monetary authority targets current inﬂation. If v =
−1 the policy rule is backward-looking, whereas v = 1 corresponds to forward-looking
inﬂation targeting. The parameter µ determines whether monetary policy is active or
passive. An active monetary policy corresponds to µ > 1, where the real interest rate
rises in response to higher inﬂation, as the monetary authority increases the nominal
interest rate by more than the increase in inﬂation. A passive monetary policy on the
other hand corresponds to 0 ≤ µ < 1, where the real interest rate falls in response to
higher inﬂation.
2.5 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods market requires
ZH,t + Z∗
H,t = Yt. (24)
Total home demand must equal the supply of the ﬁnal good,
Zt = Ct + It, (25)
and the labor, capital, money and bond markets all clear:
Υt = Mt − Mt−1 Bt + B∗
t = 0. (26)
Deﬁnition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium): Given an initial allocation of Bt0,
B∗
t0, Kt0, K∗
t0, and Mt0−1, M∗
t0−1, a rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences
{Ct, C∗
t , Mt, M∗
t , Lt, L∗
t, Kt, K∗
t , Bt, Bt, Rt, R∗
t, MCt, MC∗
t , wt, w∗
t, rrt, rr∗
t , Yt, Y ∗
t ,
et, Qt, Pt, P ∗
t , PH,t,   PH,t,   P ∗
F,t, P ∗
H,t, PF,t, P ∗
F,t, Zt, Z∗
t , ZH,t, ZF,t, Z∗
H,t, Z∗
F,t} for all
t ≥ t0 characterized by: (i) the optimality conditions of the representative agent, (16) to
(19), and the capital accumulation equation (15); (ii) the intermediate ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order
conditions (8) and (9), price-setting rules, (11) and (12), and the aggregate version of the
production function (7); (iii) the ﬁnal good producer’s optimality conditions, (2), and
(4); (iv) all markets clear, (24) to (26); (v) the representative agent’s budget constraint
10(14) is satisﬁed and the transversality conditions hold; (vi) the monetary policy rule is
satisﬁed, (22) or (23); along with the foreign counterparts for (i)-(vi) and conditions (5),
(6), (20) and (21).
2.6 Local Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to analyze the equilibrium dynamics of the model, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approxi-
mation is taken around a steady state to replace the non-linear equilibrium system with
an approximation which is linear.9 We employ the Aoki (1981) decomposition which
decomposes the two-country model into two decoupled dynamic systems: the aggregate
system that captures the properties of the closed world economy10 and the diﬀerence
system that portrays the open-economy dimension. Consequently for the equilibrium to
be determinate it must be the case that there is a unique solution both for cross-country
diﬀerences and world aggregates. The complete linearized system of equations is sum-
marized in Table 1. Note that since money balances are separable, the money demand
equation and its foreign equivalent are irrelevant for equilibrium determinacy and are sub-
sequently ignored. In what follows below it will also be convenient to deﬁne x ≡ L
K. The
parameters of the model are as follows: σ > 0 measures the intertemporal substitution
elasticity of consumption; φ > 0 measures the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity;
0 < α < 1 measures the production input share of intermediate ﬁrms; θ > 0 measures
the elasticity of substitution between aggregate home and foreign goods; λ > 1 is the
degree of monopolistic competition in the intermediate ﬁrm sector; Λ1 ≡
(1−ψ)(1−βψ)
ψ > 0
is the real marginal cost elasticity of inﬂation, where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and
0 < ψ < 1 is the degree of price stickiness; and a ∈ {(0,0.5) ∪ (0.5,1)} is the degree of
trade openness measured by the relative share of intermediate imports used in ﬁnal good
production (1 − a).11
9To be precise the model is linearized around a symmetric steady state in which prices in the two countries






F). Then by deﬁnition inﬂation is zero
(π = π∗ = 1), and the steady state terms of trade and nominal and real exchange rates are T = e = Q = 1.
10The choice of which index of inﬂation each monetary authority targets is irrelevant for the aggregate








11The analysis does not consider the case when a = 0.5 since this would imply that purchasing power parity
(PPP) is satisﬁed and consequently the linearized inﬂation equation   πR
t = (2a−1)  π
R(h−f∗)
t +2(1−a)∆  et
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σ + α  xR
t + 2(1 − a)  Tt Marginal cost
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t = (2a − 1)  π
R(h−f
∗)
t + 2(1 − a)∆  et Inﬂation
  Qt = 1
σ
  CR
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t Marginal cost
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Notes: The index R refers to the diﬀerence between home and foreign variables e.g.   C
R
t ≡  



















2 and ∆  et ≡   et −   et−1. The parameters are deﬁned as: Λ1 ≡
(1−ψ)(1−βψ)
ψ ,





(2a−1) + 1 − δ
 
















We start by examining the conditions for equilibrium determinacy when monetary policy
is characterized by a current-looking rule. First note that for a labor-only version of this
open economy model, in which production is linear in labor (α = 0), under a current-
looking rule the Taylor principle (µ > 1) prevents the emergence of real indeterminacy
for both the aggregate and diﬀerence systems.12 As this section shows the conditions for
reduces to the relative PPP condition for consumer price inﬂation i.e.   πR
t = ∆  et.
12For example, as shown by McKnight (2007), the Taylor principle is both a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for local determinacy of the aggregate system and the diﬀerence system when domestic inﬂation
is targeted. If CPI inﬂation is targeted then the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for determinacy
12determinacy alter substantially with the inclusion of capital.
3.1 Aggregate System
The set of linearized equations for the world aggregates, given in Table 1, can be reduced
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K + σα C











Since the dynamics of mc, x, and π are independent of the capital stock dynamics, one
eigenvalue of the system is 1 + C
K > 1. Consequently, given that capital is the only
predetermined variable in the column vector bW, equilibrium determinacy requires that
two of the remaining eigenvalues of AW are outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue is
inside the unit circle. Then by Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) the following result
is obtained:
Proposition 1 Suppose that monetary policy is characterized by a current-looking inter-
est rate rule. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy of the aggregate
system is µ > 1 and either







− 1 − Λ1(1 − α)
 






ψ and Λ2 = 1 − β(1 − δ).
The determinacy conditions summarized in Proposition 1 are isomorphic to the conditions
obtained by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) for the closed-economy. Suppose α = 0.36,
β = 0.99 and δ = 0.025. For these parameter values (27) is violated only if ψ ≥ 0.75.
Thus if prices are suﬃciently sticky, indeterminacy (of order two) can arise for some values
of the diﬀerence system.
13of µ > 1 provided condition (28) is violated. However the region of indeterminacy is small.
For example if ψ = 0.8 then indeterminacy arises provided 1.1 < µ < 1.71, whereas if
ψ = 0.75 condition (28) is satisﬁed ∀µ > 1 and thus indeterminacy is not possible.
3.2 Diﬀerence System
3.2.1 Domestic Price Inﬂation
If domestic price inﬂation is the policy indicator, then the set of linearized conditions for
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1 − α(2a − 1) + Λ1
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K [1 + α4θa(1 − a)] +
σα(2a−1) C
K. As before, the capital stock dynamics can be decoupled from the rest of the
system. However, the eigenvalue associated with the capital stock dynamics now depends
on the degree of trade openness. Consequently this eigenvalue can be either inside or
outside the unit circle depending on the value of a. The Appendix proves the following:13
Proposition 2 Suppose that monetary policy reacts to current-looking domestic price
inﬂation. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), the necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for determinacy of the diﬀerence system are:
(Case I) a > 0.5 and either







+ Λ4 − (1 + Λ1 + Λ2β)
 




13While determinacy of the diﬀerence system can also be achieved under a passive monetary policy (µ < 1),
such conditions are not reported since the aggregate system is always indeterminate (from Proposition
1).










and 1 + µ <
2(1 + β)Λ2
Λ1 [(1 − 2a)α(2 − Λ2) − Λ2]
if
2α(1 − 2a)
1 + α(1 − 2a)
> Λ2;










< 0.5 and (31)
(i) 1 + µ >
2(1 + β)Λ2
Λ1 [(1 − 2a)α(2 − Λ2) − Λ2]
and (ii)
2α(1 − 2a)




ψ , Λ2 = 1 − β(1 − δ) and Λ4 = Λ1α(2a − 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ￿
Cases I and II of Proposition 2 show the regions of determinacy when the root associ-
ated with the capital stock dynamics is unstable, whereas Case III shows the regions of
determinacy when this root is stable. We illustrate these determinacy conditions using
the following parameter values. Suppose α = 0.36, β = 0.99, δ = 0.025, λ = 7.66 and
ψ = 0.75. Figure 1 depicts the regions in the parameter space (a, µ) that are associated
with determinacy (D), ﬁrst-order indeterminacy (I1) and second-order indeterminacy (I2)
around the neighborhood of the steady state.14 If the degree of trade openness is suf-
ﬁciently low (a > 0.5) then second-order indeterminacy can arise in the open-economy.
This follows from the violation of conditions (29) and (30) of Case I in Proposition 2.
Indeed comparing (29) with condition (27) of Proposition 1 yields
(2β − 1)Λ2 < Λ1 [1 − β(1 − δ)(1 − (2a − 1)α)] < Λ1 [1 − β(1 − δ)(1 − α)],
which by inspection implies that a higher degree of price stickiness is required in the
open economy to prevent the emergence of second-order indeterminacy. Furthermore, as
depicted in Figure 1, if the degree of trade openness is suﬃciently high then ﬁrst-order
indeterminacy can also exist. This arises from the violation of condition (32) of Case III
in Proposition 2. First consider condition (31). Under the assigned parameter values,
14Recall that with these parameter values indeterminacy is not possible in the closed-economy (aggregate
system) ∀µ > 1.



















Figure 1: Regions of determinacy under a current-looking domestic price inﬂation rule
Case III is relevant for any a < 0.471615 and condition (ii) of (32) is always satisﬁed.16
Thus from condition (i) of (32) ﬁrst-order indeterminacy can arise provided the inﬂation
coeﬃcient µ is suﬃciently low. It is straightforward to show that this lower bound on µ




4αΛ2(2 − Λ2)(1 + β)
[(1 − 2a)α(2 − Λ2) − Λ2]
2 < 0
and thus as the degree of trade openness is reduced, the higher the inﬂation coeﬃcient
that is required to prevent indeterminacy.
3.2.2 Consumer Price Inﬂation
If consumer price inﬂation is the policy indicator, then the set of linearized conditions for
cross-country diﬀerences yields the ﬁve-dimensional system of the form:
15Note that this threshold level for a is independent of the degree of price stickiness (ψ). Furthermore it is
remarkably robust to variations in α and λ. For example setting λ = 4 requires a < 0.467 whereas setting
α = 0.25 requires a < 0.459.
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Λ2 , J2 =
2(1−a)µ
(2a−1)β, J3 = µ− 1




K [1 + α4θa(1 − a)]+
σα(2a − 1) C
K. Now there are two predetermined variables   KR
t and   πR
t−1. Note that the
eigenvalue associated with the capital stock dynamics is the same regardless of the index
of inﬂation targeted. The Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 3 Suppose that monetary policy reacts to current-looking consumer price
inﬂation. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), the necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for determinacy of the diﬀerence system are:
(Case I) a > 0.5 and at least one of (33) and (34) is satisﬁed;
µ >










2(1 − a)(1 − β)µ +
Λ4[µ − (1 − Λ2)]
Λ2
− (1 + Λ1)
 
















2Λ2(1 + β)[1 + 2µ(1 − a)]
(1 + µ)[α(1 − 2a)(2 − Λ2) − Λ2]
if
2α(1 − 2a)
1 + α(1 − 2a)
> Λ2, (35)
and at least one of (33) and (34) is satisﬁed;
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ψ , Λ2 = 1 − β(1 − δ) and Λ4 = Λ1α(2a − 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.2. ￿
Comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 highlight important qualitative diﬀerences between
reacting to consumer and domestic price inﬂation. First, the range of second-order in-
determinacy is relatively lower if consumer price inﬂation is targeted. This follows from
direct comparison of conditions (29) and (33):
(2β − 1)Λ2 < Γ1 < 2βΛ2(1 − a)µ + Γ1,
where Γ1 = Λ1 [1 − β(1 − δ)(1 − (2a − 1)α)]. Secondly, the range of ﬁrst-order indeter-
minacy is relatively greater under consumer price inﬂation targeting. By comparing the
Case III conditions of Propositions 2 and 3, it is straightforward to show that (36) is a
stronger requirement for determinacy than condition (i) of (32).17 Furthermore by com-
paring condition (ii) of (32) with (37), reacting to consumer price inﬂation introduces an
additional determinacy condition given by Λ2 <
Λ1α(1−2a)
2(1−a) . Figure 2 depicts the regions
in the parameter space (a, µ) that are associated with determinacy (D) and (ﬁrst-order)
indeterminacy (I) around the neighborhood of the steady state given α = 0.36, β = 0.99,
δ = 0.025, λ = 7.66 and ψ = 0.75. First observe that second-order indeterminacy does
not arise under these parameter values. Furthermore determinacy exists only if the de-
gree of trade openness is suﬃciently large a ≥ 0.4716, otherwise ﬁrst-order indeterminacy
prevails for any value of µ > 1.
3.3 Discussion
In the absence of capital the Taylor principle holds under a current-looking rule regardless
of whether the economy is open or closed. However as shown in the previous section,





















Figure 2: Regions of determinacy under a current-looking consumer price inﬂation rule
the inclusion of capital generates substantial diﬀerences for equilibrium determinacy not
only between closed and open-economies, but also between the index of inﬂation targeted.
What is the economic intuition behind these results? First consider a labor-only economy.
Suppose that in response to a non-fundamental shock agents believe (CPI) inﬂation will
increase. In a closed-economy an active monetary policy (µ > 1) increases the real interest
rate. From the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy this reduces (real) marginal
cost such that current inﬂation rises by less than expected inﬂation via the Phillips curve.
In an open economy the CPI inﬂation rate depends on both the domestic inﬂation rate
and the terms of trade:
  πt =   πh
t + (1 − a)
 
  Tt −   Tt−1
 
(38)
where   Tt−1 is predetermined. An increase in the real interest rate not only reduces do-
mestic inﬂation via a fall in marginal cost but in addition results in an improvement in
the terms of trade (  Tt ↓). From (38) this trade channel of monetary policy generates
additional downward pressure on CPI inﬂation. Consequently for both closed and open-
economies the initial belief cannot be self-fulﬁlling. Now consider an economy with capital
accumulation. Here the initial increase in inﬂationary expectations can be self-fulﬁlling
provided that there is a further rise in expected inﬂation. This can occur since an in-
crease in the real interest rate puts upward pressure on the expected future rental price
19of capital (from the investment condition (18)) which leads to an increase in expected
future marginal cost and thus an additional rise in expected future inﬂation. Therefore
indeterminacy is generated if the eﬀect of this cost channel of monetary policy is suﬃ-
ciently strong to counteract the downward pressure on inﬂation arising from the aggregate
demand channel. In the open-economy the increase in expected future marginal cost is
exacerbated as the degree of trade openness increases. This strengthens the eﬀect of the
cost channel making a rise in domestic price inﬂation more likely. From (38) there are
two opposing eﬀects on CPI inﬂation, the strength of both are increasing as the degree
of trade openness increases (a ↓). Therefore depending on the size of a this determines
which eﬀect dominates and thus whether the initial inﬂationary belief is validated.
4 The Timing of Interest-rate Rules
So far the analysis has focused on interest-rate rules that target contemporaneous inﬂa-
tion. In this section we consider interest-rate rules that react to either forward-looking or
backward-looking inﬂation.
4.1 Forward-looking rules
We start by examining the conditions for equilibrium determinacy under forward-looking
inﬂation rules. The aggregate and diﬀerence systems are both four-dimensional generating
a zero eigenvalue in each case. Since capital is the only predetermined variable, equilibrium
determinacy requires the remaining three eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle. This
automatically suggests that for determinacy of the diﬀerence system, the root associated
with the capital stock dynamics must be unstable, which in turn implies that determinacy
is impossible for suﬃciently open economies.
4.1.1 Aggregate System
Under a forward-looking rule, the set of linearized equations for the world aggregates,
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One eigenvalue of the system is given by 1 + C
K > 1, while another eigenvalue is zero.
Consequently, equilibrium determinacy requires that the two remaining eigenvalues of BW
are outside the unit circle. Then by Proposition C.1 of Woodford (2003) the following
result is obtained:
Proposition 4 Suppose that monetary policy is characterized by a forward-looking inter-
est rate rule. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy of the aggregate
system is














ψ and Λ2 = 1 − β(1 − δ).
As discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) the regions of determinacy for a closed-
economy are remarkably narrow under a forward-looking rule with capital.18 Again sup-
pose that α = 0.36, β = 0.99 and δ = 0.025. Then the upper bound for determinacy is
1.01124 = ΓA
1 < ΓA
2 . Propositions 5 and 6 below show that in an open-economy the range
of determinacy is even smaller.
4.1.2 Diﬀerence System
The set of linearized conditions for cross-country diﬀerences yields a system of the form:
18Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) present a necessary condition for determinacy, whereas Proposition 4 provides
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βΛ2 under domestic inﬂation
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K. Analogous
to the aggregate system, one eigenvalue of the system is zero. Therefore determinacy
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to have a modulus greater than one,
and the two remaining eigenvalues of BR are also outside the unit circle. By Proposition
C.1 of Woodford (2003) the following results are obtained:
Proposition 5 Suppose that monetary policy reacts to forward-looking domestic price
inﬂation. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), the necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for determinacy of the diﬀerence system are
(Case I) a > 0.5 and
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ψ and Λ2 = 1 − β(1 − δ).
Proposition 6 Suppose that monetary policy reacts to forward-looking consumer price
inﬂation. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), the necessary and suﬃcient con-
22ditions for determinacy of the diﬀerence system are
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Suppose α = 0.36, β = 0.99, δ = 0.025 and λ = 7.66. Given the assigned parameter
values conditions (41) and (43) of Propositions 5 and 6 are violated if a < 0.4716 and thus
(ﬁrst-order) indeterminacy arises ∀µ > 1. If a > 0.5 then under domestic price inﬂation
targeting the open-economy introduces no additional requirements for determinacy. This





2 . However if a > 0.5 and consumer price inﬂation is targeted then




2 . Since ∂ΓC
i /∂a > 0 for i = 1,2,3,
the inﬂation coeﬃcient µ is constrained by these upper bounds, all of which are increasing
with respect to a. Thus the range of indeterminacy is potentially greater the higher the
degree of trade openness (i.e. the lower is a).
As discussed by Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2007) in a closed economy an active
forward-looking policy makes inﬂation expectations self-fulﬁlling entirely because of the
cost channel of monetary policy. However in the open-economy indeterminacy is more
severe because of the additional impact the trade channel has on inﬂation. Under an active
forward-looking policy, the increase in the real interest rate results in a future expected
deterioration in the terms of trade (  Tt+1 increases relative to   Tt). Thus the trade eﬀect
puts upward
Et  πt+1 = Et  πh
t+1 + (1 − a)
 
Et   Tt+1 −   Tt
 
pressure on inﬂation, the eﬀect of which is stronger the higher the degree of trade openness
(a ↓).
234.2 Backward-looking rules
We now turn our attention to backward-looking interest-rate rules. The determinacy
analysis proceeds as before except now the aggregate system is ﬁve-dimensional and de-
terminacy requires two eigenvalues to lie inside the unit circle and the remaining three
eigenvalues be outside the unit circle. The diﬀerence system is six-dimensional under con-
sumer price inﬂation targeting and determinacy therefore requires that there are exactly
three eigenvalues inside the unit circle and three eigenvalues outside the unit circle. As
before the capital dynamics eigenvalue can lie inside or outside the unit circle depending
on the size of a. Since responding to backward inﬂation makes the analytical conditions
for determinacy more complex to derive, we will simply report some numerical results.
Suppose α = 0.36, β = 0.99 and δ = 0.025. Then determinacy of the aggregate system
requires that 1 < µ < 3.171 otherwise no equilibrium exists. Figures 3 and 4 depict the
regions in the parameter space (a, µ) that are associated with determinacy (D), (ﬁrst-
order) indeterminacy (I) and an explosive solution (N) around the neighborhood of the
steady state, for both possible indexes of inﬂation. First consider the case when the
capital dynamics root is unstable (a ≥ 0.4716). Inspection of ﬁgure 3 suggests that if
domestic price inﬂation is targeted the open-economy places no additional restrictions for
equilibrium determinacy. However if consumer price inﬂation is targeted, ﬁgure 4 sug-
gests that the upper bound on the inﬂation coeﬃcient is more severe in the open-economy.
Furthermore the range of determinacy decreases as the degree of trade openness increases
therefore implying that this upper bound is increasing with respect to a. Next consider
the case where the eigenvalue associated with the capital dynamics lies inside the unit cir-
cle (a < 0.4716). If domestic price inﬂation is targeted then determinacy is not possible,
whereas if consumer price inﬂation is targeted determinacy prevails.


















Figure 3: Regions of determinacy under a backward-looking domestic price inﬂation rule

















Figure 4: Regions of determinacy under a backward-looking consumer price inﬂation rule
25The above analysis suggests that in the presence of capital there are important im-
plications for equilibrium determinacy depending on whether the economy is open or
closed. In a closed-economy, indeterminacy can easily be prevented by avoiding forward-
looking interest-rate rules. However in open-economies implementing current-looking or
backward-looking policies is contingent upon the degree of trade openness of the econ-
omy in question. For suﬃciently closed economies, the monetary authority should adopt
a current-looking CPI interest-rate rule to minimize policy-induced aggregate instabil-
ity. However for economies that are suﬃciently open to trade a backward-looking CPI
interest-rate rule is a more appropriate policy.
5 Conclusion
This paper has considered the importance of trade openness for equilibrium determinacy
in the presence of capital and investment spending. It has been shown that policy in-
duced indeterminacy is considerably easier to obtain using a sticky-price open-economy
model compared to its closed-economy variant. This conclusion is robust to the index of
inﬂation chosen as the policy indicator and the timing of the interest-rate rule employed.
The analysis suggests that considerable care needs to be taken when designing interest-
rate rules for economies that actively engage in cross-country trade. Adopting policies
advocated for closed-economies, may not be suﬃcient to prevent the emergence of real
indeterminacy.
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28A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
As shown in the main text, if monetary policy targets current-looking domestic price
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, where   KR
is the only predetermined endogenous variable. Determinacy of the diﬀerence system
thus requires one eigenvalue to lie inside the unit circle and the other three eigenvalues
to lie outside the unit circle. One eigenvalue of the coeﬃcient matrix AR
PPI is given by




K + 2δ(1 − a)
 
, which modulus can be greater or less than one. The




PPI. Then the characteristic equation of A
R
PPI is
r3 + a2r2 + a1r + a0 = 0
where





























First suppose the eigenvalue eK is unstable, |eK| > 1, which requires either a > 0.5 or
0.5 > a > 1
2−δ
 





. Then using Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003), two of the
remaining three eigenvalues are outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue is inside the
unit circle if and only if: (Case I)
1 + a2 + a1 + a0 > 0 ⇔
(µ − 1)Λ1
β
[1 − (2a − 1)α] < 0, (A1)
−1 + a2 − a1 + a0 > 0 ⇔ −2(1 + β) − (µ + 1)Λ1
 
1 +





1 + a2 + a1 + a0 > 0 ⇔
(µ − 1)Λ1
β
[1 − (2a − 1)α] > 0, (A3)
29−1 + a2 − a1 + a0 > 0 ⇔ −2(1 + β) − (µ + 1)Λ1
 
1 +






0 − a0a2 + a1 − 1 > 0, (A5a)
or
|a2| < −3. (A5b)
Assume µ > 1, since otherwise the aggregate system would be indeterminate. Then Case
I is not relevant since condition (A1) is violated by assumption. For Case II, condition
(A3) is satisﬁed ∀ µ > 1 since 1 − α(2a − 1) > 0. If a > 0.5 then by inspection condition
(A4) is automatically satisﬁed and either (A5a) or (A5b) is required for determinacy. If




Λ1(1 − 2a)(µ − 1)
Λ2
+ Λ1 + Λ2β + (1 − 2a)αΛ1
 
+(1 − β) + Λ1µ +
Λ1α(1 − 2a)µ(1 − β)
Λ2β
> 0,
which is always satisﬁed by inspection and thus condition (A5b) does not apply. Fi-
nally condition (A4) is automatically satisﬁed provided
(1−2a)α(2−Λ2)
Λ2 < 1. Otherwise the
following upper bound on µ is required: µ <
2(1+β)Λ2
Λ1[(1−2a)α(2−Λ2)−Λ2] − 1.
Now suppose that the eigenvalue eK is stable, |eK| < 1 which requires a < 1
2−δ
 






0.5. Determinacy then requires that the remaining three eigenvalues be outside the unit
circle. From the characteristic equation of A
R
PPI this implies that r(0) =
Λ1µα(1−2a)
Λ2β > 0.
If µ > 1 then r(1) =
(µ−1)Λ1
β [1 + α(1 − 2a)] > 0. Therefore if r(−1) > 0 then







, then r(−1) > 0 provided α(1−2a)(2−Λ2) > Λ2
and 1 + µ >
2(1+β)Λ2
Λ1[α(1−2a)(2−Λ2)−Λ2]. This completes the proof. ￿
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If monetary policy targets current-looking consumer price inﬂation then one eigenvalue of
the coeﬃcient matrix AR
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Hence one eigenvalue is zero and the three remaining eigenvalues are the solutions to the
cubic equation r3+a3r2+a2r+a1 = 0. Determinacy requires two eigenvalues to lie inside
the unit circle and the other three eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle. First suppose
the eigenvalue eK is outside the unit circle |eK| > 1, which requires either a > 0.5 or
0.5 > a > 1
2−δ
 





. Then using Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003), two of the
remaining three eigenvalues are outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue is inside the
unit circle if and only if: (Case I)
1 + a3 + a2 + a1 > 0 ⇔
(µ − 1)Λ1
β
[1 − (2a − 1)α] < 0, (B1)
−1+a3−a2+a1 > 0 ⇔ −2(1+β)−4µ(1−a)(1+β)−(µ+1)Λ1
 
1 +






1 + a3 + a2 + a1 > 0 ⇔
(µ − 1)Λ1
β
[1 − (2a − 1)α] > 0, (B3)
−1+a3−a2+a1 > 0 ⇔ −2(1+β)−4µ(1−a)(1+β)−(µ+1)Λ1
 
1 +







1 − a1a3 + a2 − 1 > 0, (B5a)
31or
|a3| < −3. (B5b)
Assume µ > 1, or otherwise the aggregate system would be indeterminate, then Case
I is not relevant since condition (B1) is violated by assumption. For Case II, condition
(B3) is satisﬁed ∀µ > 1. If a > 0.5 then by inspection condition (B4) is automatically
satisﬁed and either (B5a) or (B5b) is required for determinacy. If a < 0.5 condition (B4)
is automatically satisﬁed provided
(1−2a)α(2−Λ2)
Λ2 < 1. Otherwise the following condition
is required: Λ1(1 + µ)[α(1 − 2a)(2 − Λ2) − Λ2] < 2Λ2(1 + β)[1 + 2µ(1 − a)]. In addition
either (B5a) or (B5b) is required for determinacy.
Now suppose that the eigenvalue eK is inside the unit circle |eK| < 1, which re-
quires a < 1
2−δ
 





< 0.5. Determinacy then requires that the remaining three
eigenvalues be outside the unit circle. From the characteristic equation of A
R
CPI this
implies that r(1) =
(µ−1)Λ1









. This has to be positive r(0) > 0 otherwise there would
be (at least) one stable root, which requires Λ1α(1 − 2a) > 2(1 − a)Λ2. Therefore if







, then r(−1) > 0 provided
α(1−2a)(2−Λ2) > Λ2 and Λ1(1+µ)[α(1 − 2a)(2 − Λ2) − Λ2] > 2Λ2(1+β)[1+2µ(1−a)].
This completes the proof. ￿
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